










AMERICAN IDOL: SHOULD IT BE A SINGING 




J. ATSU AMEGASHIE 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2171 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




AMERICAN IDOL: SHOULD IT BE A SINGING 





In the very popular FOX TV reality show, American Idol, the judges, who are presumably 
experts in evaluating singing effort, have no voting power when the field is narrowed to the 
top twenty-four contestants. It is only the votes of viewers that count. In the 2007 season of 
the show, one of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to quit the show if a contestant, 
Sanjaya Malakar, who was clearly a low-ability contestant, won the competition. He was 
concerned that the show was becoming a popularity contest instead of a singing contest. Is 
this a problem? Not necessarily. I show that, under certain conditions, making success in the 
contest dependent on a contestant’s popularity and not solely on her singing ability or 
performance, could paradoxically increase aggregate singing effort. It may be optimal to give 
the entire voting power to the viewers whose evaluation of singing effort or ability is noisier. 
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1. Introduction 
 
American Idol and Dancing with the stars are two very successful reality shows
1 
on the American TV networks, Fox and ABC, respectively.
2 American Idol is particularly 
successful. With the exception of the Super Bowl and the Academy Awards, American 
Idol is the highest rated viewed 
3program on U.S. national television and is broadcast in 
over 100 countries outside of the USA. 
American Idol is a singing contest and Dancing with the Stars is a dancing 
contest. A unique feature of these two TV shows is that the votes of viewers count in 
determining the winner of the show. For example, in Dancing with the stars, the votes of 
both the viewers and the judges (i.e., the experts) count. In American Idol, only the votes 
of the judges count in the preliminary rounds and only the votes of viewers count in 
advanced rounds (i.e., when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants). 
Since the judges and viewers may have different preferences, these can sometimes lead to 
problems. Indeed, in the 2007 season of American idol, there was a low-ability 
contestant, Sanjaya Malakar, who the judges did not like but kept advancing through the 
                                                 
1American Idol, which debuted in 2002, is an offshoot of Pop Idol, a British television (singing) reality 
show which debuted on the ITV network in 2001. As noted at wikipedia.com, the Idol series has become an 
international franchise; it has spun off many successful shows such as Australian Idol, Latin American Idol, 
Idols (Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, South Africa), Canadian Idol, Idols West Africa, Indian Idol, 
Indonesian Idol, New Zealand Idol, Hay Superstar, Nouvelle Star , Pinoy Idol (Philippines), Deutschland 
sucht den Superstar, Singapore Idol, Malaysian Idol, Vietnam Idol, Music Idol, Ídolos Brazil, Ídolos 
Portugal, and Super Star. 
2Some of the top twelve finalists on American Idol have gone on to chalk successes: six of them of have 
been nominated for the 2008 Grammy awards. One of them, Carrie Underwood has already won a Grammy 
and Jennifer Hudson, through the exposure that the show gave her, had the opportunity to star in the movie 
Dreamgirls which won her an Oscar in 2007. The websites for both shows can be found at: 
http://www.americanidol.com/ and http://abc.go.com/primetime/dancingwiththestars/index?pn=index 
3 Note that the Super Bowl and Academy Awards take place only once in a year. In each season, American 
Idol is shown twice a week over a 4-month period. In this sense, it is the number one rated show in 
America.   2
rounds because the viewers liked him. One of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to 
quit the show if Sanjaya won the competition.  
To be sure, American Idol is a singing contest, but it sometimes runs the risk of 
becoming a popularity contest. One way of dealing with this apparent problem is to 
allocate the entire voting power to the judges. However, that might lead to a huge fall in 
TV ratings and revenue. A reason why the votes of viewers is allowed to determine the 
winner(s) is because it gives the viewers a sense of participation and increases the 
numbers of viewers leading to an increase in TV ratings and revenue. Allowing the votes 
of viewers to count increases the excitement of the show. There may well be a trade-off 
between this participation effect and the possible disincentive effect on singing effort of 
allowing any Tom, Dick, and Harry who has a phone to vote.  
In American Idol, as mentioned above, only the votes of judges count in 
preliminary rounds. This allows the judges to narrow the set of possible contestants in 
order to possibly minimize any subsequent errors in selection that might emerge when 
viewers’ votes later determine the winner(s) in subsequent rounds. However, as the 
Sanjaya case demonstrated, this cannot eliminate this risk. Alternatively, in Dancing with 
the stars this problem may have been addressed by assigning non-zero weights to the 
votes of the judges and viewers. But how should these weights be determined? What 
factors should be taken into account? Could the American Idol allocation of voting power 
be optimal? In this paper, I show, among others, that differences in the abilities of the 
contestants should be an important consideration. 
I show that, under certain conditions, making success in the contest dependent on 
a contestant’s popularity and not solely on her singing ability or performance, could   3
paradoxically increase aggregate singing effort. By allowing the votes of viewers to 
count, sufficient noise is introduced into the contest since the viewers tend to care more, 
relative to the judges, about factors other than a contestant’s singing ability or 
performance. This low-powered incentive can paradoxically lead to an increase in 
aggregate efforts because it levels the playing field between high-ability contestants and 
low-ability contestants inducing the low-ability contestants to exert more effort which, in 
turn, puts pressure on the high-ability to work harder. I demonstrate this result in the next 
section and relate it to other results in the literature on contests and incentives. Section 3 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. An American-Idol type contest: a model 
 
While American Idol and Dancing with the Stars are dynamic contests, I illustrate 
the key idea of this paper by analyzing a static contest. This makes sense if the 
contestants focus on a round at a time. Indeed, most of the contestants in American Idol 
when asked about their thoughts and preparation for future rounds invariably respond that 
they are only focusing on the current round.  
Consider a singing contest, such as American Idol, Canadian Idol, or Pop Idol 
with two risk-neutral contestants. Suppose a singing effort (performance) of xk by 
contestant k translates into qk = xk + ηk votes by the judges and yk = xk + εk votes by  
 
   4
viewers, k = 1,2.
4 Assume that εk and ηk  are independently distributed random variables.
5 
Also, Cov(ε1, ε2) = Cov(η1, η2) = 0.  
I assume that εk  and ηk are each normally distributed with mean zero and 
variances,  2
ε σ  and  2
η σ  respectively. In what follows, I assume that  2
ε σ  >  2
η σ  > 0. This 
assumption is motivated by the following two reasons: (i) the judges may care more 
about effort in the contest than the viewers. The viewers may care more about a 
contestant’s popularity or personality relative to the judges, and (ii) the judges, being 
experts, can evaluate singing effort better than the viewers. 
I normalize the prize of winning the contest to 1. Let Ck(xk) = θkC(xk) be the cost 
of effort to contestant k, where  θk is a positive parameter and C(xk) is increasing and 
strictly convex. If θ1 < θ2, then contestant 1 has a higher ability than contestant 2 since his 
cost of exerting effort is lower. 
Let α be the weight given to the votes of viewers, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then 
contestant k will win the contest, if αyk + (1-α)qk >  αyj + (1-α)qj, k = 1, 2, j =1,2, and k ≠ 
j. Then contestant 1’s payoff is 
Π1= Pr(αy1 + (1-α)q1 > αy2 + (1-α)q2) – θ1C(x1)  = Pr(m < x1 – x2) – θ1C(x1), 
where m ≡ α(ε2 – ε1) + (1– α)(η2 – η1). Since εk and ηk are normally distributed with mean 
zero and variances  2
ε σ  and  2
η σ , it follows that m is normally distributed with mean zero 
                                                 
4 My treatment of the judges’ votes is analogous to the voting rule in Dancing with the Stars and figure 
skating competitions. Each judge in these contests scores a contestant’s performance out of 10 and a 
contestants’ overall score is the sum of the judges’ scores. Amegashie (2006) studies the incentive effects 
of voting by judges in international figure skating within the context of the figure skating scandal at the 
2002 winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, USA. 
5 To the extent that the judges’ votes and/or comments are observed by the viewers in both American Idol 
and Dancing with the Stars before the viewers cast their votes, one may argue that the judges’ votes could 
affect components of the viewers’ vote function. For simplicity and to allow me focus on the main 




ε σ + 2
ε σ ) + (1-α)
2( 2
η σ + 2
η σ ). Let g be the density function of m and 
G be its distribution function. 
We can write contestant 1’s payoff as  
Π1= G(x1 – x2) – θ1C(x1) .          ( 1 )  
Similarly, contestant 2’s payoff is 
Π2 = G(x2 – x1) – θ2C(x2) .          ( 2 )  
First-order conditions for an interior solution require that  0 ) x ( C ) x x ( g 1 1 2 1 = ′ θ − −  and 
0 ) x ( C ) x x ( g 2 2 1 2 = ′ θ − − . This can be rewritten as 
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From (3) and (4), it follows that, in equilibrium,  ) x ( C ) x ( C *
2 2
*
1 1 ′ θ = ′ θ . Then the 
strict convexity of C(xk) implies that  *
2
*
1 x x > , if θ1 < θ2. Therefore, in equilibrium, the 
contestant with the higher ability exerts a greater effort. Without any loss of generality, I 
assume that θ2 ≥ θ1. Hence, contestant 1 is has a higher ability than contestant 2. 
As in tournament models, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria is not 
guaranteed. Pure-strategy equilibria exist if the variance of the error terms is sufficiently 
high.
6 To elaborate on this, note that second-order conditions require 
                                                 
6 See Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). As noted by Lazear and Rosen (1981, fn. 
2), “Contests are feasible only if chance is a significant factor.” In the extreme case where the variance of 
the error terms is zero, the contest becomes a variant of a non-stochastic all-pay auction which is known to 
have no equilibrium in pure strategies (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996).   6
0 ) x ( C ) x x ( g 1 1 2 1 < ′ ′ θ − − ′  and  . 0 ) x ( C ) x x ( g 2 2 1 2 < ′ ′ θ − − ′ This condition holds for the 
high-ability contestant since  0 ) x x ( g 2 1 < − ′ given  *
2
*
1 x x > and C(x1) is strictly convex. 
However, it may not hold for the low-ability contestant. We can rewrite the low-ability 
contestant’s second-order condition as 
0 ) x ( C
2
) x x (
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The first-term on the left hand side is positive since *
2
*
1 x x > . It attains a maximum value 
at  σ − = − *
1
*
2 x x . Therefore, a sufficient but not necessary condition for (5) to hold is  













.        ( 6 )  
To simplify the analysis, I assume that C(xk) = exp(xk), k = 1,2.
7 Then since x2 ≥ 0 
and  ) x exp( ) x ( C 2 2 = ′ ′  is monotonically increasing in x2, it follows that  
)] x ( C min[ *
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Then there exists an interior solution if σ
2 is sufficiently high such that (6a) holds.  
Given that  ) x ( C ) x ( C *
2 2
*
1 1 ′ θ = ′ θ holds in equilibrium, it follows that  
) x exp( ) x exp( *
2 2
*
1 1 θ = θ . So  *
2
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7 It is not unusual to obtain results in tournament models by assuming specific functional forms for cost, 
utility, or density functions. See, for example, part of the discussion in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).   7
Aggregate effort  *
1 x +   *
2 x =   *
1 x 2 – ln(b) > 0. Hence, I investigate the effect of the 
voting weight of the viewers on aggregate effort by differentiating equation (7) with 
respect to α noting that  *
1 x  and σ
2 = 2α
2 2
ε σ  + 2(1– α)
2 2
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Now  0 >
α ∂
σ ∂
if  α 2
ε σ  > (1-α) 2
η σ . This holds if  2
ε σ  is sufficiently bigger than 2
η σ . 
In other words, relative to the judges, the viewers’ voting behavior is influenced 
sufficiently more by factors other than the singing effort of the contestants. As argued 
previously, I interpret this as meaning that the viewers are influenced more by the 
popularity of contestants than the judges are. 
When the contestants are identical (i.e., θ1 = θ2), then b = 1 since  *
1 x=*
2 x = x*. So 
ln(b) = 0. Hence  α ∂ ∂ / * x  < 0 if  α ∂ σ ∂ / > 0. Therefore, if the contestants are identical 
increasing the noise in the contest will unambiguously decrease aggregate efforts. 
 If the contestants are non-identical, then b > 1. It follows that if  α ∂ σ ∂ / > 0 and 
(ln(b)/σ)
2 – 1 > 0, the derivative in (8) is positive.  The latter condition holds if σ
2 is 
sufficiently low and/or b is sufficiently high. So under these conditions, an increase in the 
voting weight of the viewers, whose vote is influenced relatively more by factors other 
than the singing effort of the contestants, could paradoxically lead to an increase in the 
aggregate singing effort in the contest. This means that α* = 1 could be optimal. This 
leads to the following proposition:   8
Proposition 1: Consider a contest, such as American Idol, with expert judges and non-
expert judges (i.e., the viewers). If (i) the viewers’ voting behavior is sufficiently noisier 
than that of the expert judges, (ii) the difference in the ability of the contestants is 
sufficiently high, and (iii) the weighted noise of the expert judges’ votes and the viewers’ 
votes is sufficiently low, then giving a bigger voting weight to the viewers would lead to 
an increase in aggregate effort in the contest. 
 
 2.1 Discussion and relation to previous literature 
The intuition for the result in the preceding paragraph is based on a well-known 
result in contests. The more level is the playing field, the higher is aggregate efforts. In 
the same vein, increasing the voting weight of the viewers introduces more noise into the 
contest and does not make success too sensitive to effort. This levels the playing field by 
giving low-ability contestants a reasonable chance of success and thereby inducing them 
to boost their effort. By boosting their effort, they force the high-ability contestants to 
also boost their effort (i.e.,  *
2
*
1 x / x ∂ ∂ > 0). It is important to note that this effect is a 
strategic effect. Knowing that the effort of a high-ability contestant does not have a very 
strong impact on his success in the contest induces a low-ability contestant to exert more 
effort than he would otherwise. And this forces the high-ability contestant to react 
accordingly.  
To be sure, there are two opposing effects: a contestant has the incentive to slack 
if the contest becomes noisier. For want of a better term, I refer to this as the non-
strategic effect. However, the strategic effect described above may be strong enough to 
counteract this non-strategic effect. The ambiguity of the derivative in (8) is the result of   9
these two opposing effects. This strategic effect exists when the contestants are non-
identical (i.e., b >1) and it is very strong if the difference in the abilities of the contestants 
is sufficiently high (i.e., b is sufficiently high). When the contestants are identical, then 
by definition, there cannot be a common change in the contest that will level the playing  
field anymore than it already is.
8  
On the preceding point, it is interesting to note that Sanjaya Malakar, realizing 
that he had a decent chance of being the winner or advancing to subsequent rounds (in 
American Idol) tried harder to improve upon his singing performance. Of course, the 
viewers do not vote entirely on popularity. A contestant’s singing performance also 
influences their votes. That was partly why Sanjaya Malakar was eventually voted out 
after he made it into the top seven contestants. To be sure, some noise in the contest is 
desirable but too much of it is clearly not desirable. This explains why the second-order 
condition in (6) and (ln(b)/σ)
2 – 1 > 0 place upper and lower bounds on σ
2.
9 
The intuition behind the above result has been applied in other papers. For 
example, Che and Gale (1998) showed that a cap on lobbying could lead to an increase in 
aggregate lobbying because high-ability contestants find it more difficult to pre-empt the 
                                                 
8 Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) find that increasing the variance of the noise in a tournament with identical 
contestants could lead to an increase in efforts. No intuition is given for this result and, unlike this paper, 
their result does not hinge on differences in the abilities of the contestants. Also, they model the production 
function of contestant k as yk = ηxk + εk. It is the variance of the common noise variable η (not the 
idiosyncratic noise, εk) that accounts for their result. I am not aware of any paper in the literature on 
tournaments that argues that aggregate efforts will be higher as the tournament becomes noisier, given that 
the contestants are sufficiently non-identical. 
9 In a different context, Myerson (1991) shows that a noisy communication channel can improve 
information transmission relative to a non-noisy communication channel. Blume, Board, and Kawamura 
(2007) extend the seminal contribution in Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of strategic information 
transmission by incorporating communication error (i.e, noise). An informed sender (i.e., an expert) sends a 
message to an uninformed receiver. With some probability, messages sent will not be received. Instead 
received messages are drawn from a fixed error distribution. Otherwise, messages go through as sent. 
Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007) show that this noisy communication channel is welfare-improving, if 
the noise is sufficiently small. Specifically, there is an equilibrium of the noise model that is Pareto superior 
to all equilibria of the Crawford-Sobel model.   10
efforts of low-ability contestants. Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) also apply this 
reasoning to a third-party’s intervention decision in a conflict. In their model, helping a 
faction in the conflict, which takes the form of subsidizing his cost of effort, increases his 
valuation (i.e., the valuation effect). This will cause him to increase his effort. But this 
help also exerts an inequality effect by widening the “playing field” if the stronger faction 
is helped and narrowing it if the weaker faction is helped. Hence if the weaker faction is 
helped, the valuation effect and the inequality effect move in the same direction resulting 
in an increase in the aggregate cost of conflict. So the weaker faction should not be 
helped if the third-party’s goal is to reduce the aggregate cost of the conflict. On the other 
hand, helping the stronger faction widens the difference in the abilities of the contestants, 
so the inequality effect will result in a fall in aggregate effort. Of course, the increase in 
the valuation of the stronger faction will lead to an increase in his effort. Therefore, if the 
third-party wants to minimize the aggregate cost of the conflict, then he should help the 
stronger party if the inequality effect dominates the valuation effect.
10 Otherwise, he 
should not help either faction. Szymanski and Valletti (2005) found that in a contest with 
an outstanding contestant, concentrating the entire prize into a grand single prize for first 
place may actually lower aggregate efforts, since the other contestants may not exert 
enough effort because they do not think that the have a decent chance of winning. By 
splitting the prize into a first prize and a second prize, the playing field is somewhat 
leveled inducing the low-ability contestants to exert greater effort which, in turn, forces 
the outstanding contestant to also increase his effort. Finally, Fu (2006) found that if a 
contest-designer handicaps a high-ability contestant relative to a low-ability contestant, 
                                                 
10 The inequality effect and valuation effect are the analogues of the strategic and non-strategic effects 
discussed above.   11
aggregate efforts increase although this widens the difference in efforts between the 
contestants. 
One may argue that placing some weight on popularity may cause the contestants 
to divert their efforts from singing into non-singing efforts in the competition. In this 
case, one requires a model where the contestants invest in both singing and non-singing 
efforts. Such a contest will be similar to multi-activity contests as in Amegashie (2006), 
Konrad and Clark (2007), and Arbatskaya and Mialon (2007). To focus on the key 
driving force behind proposition 1, I do not consider this possible effect.  
Indeed, the diversion of efforts from singing to non-singing efforts is not borne 
out in reality. For example, contestants in American Idol focus their energies on 
improving their singing performance. They understand that they are in singing contest. 
The fact that viewers care about non-singing factors in addition to singing performance 
does not imply that the contestants will go out of their way to invest in non-singing 
activities. This will especially be the case if the contestants are uncertain about the 
viewers’ preferences over non-singing activities. Thus the model in this paper is 
applicable if the contestants are uncertain about the kind of non-singing factors that the 
viewers care about. These non-singing attributes could have several components 
including hairstyle, smile, sense of humor, tone of voice when speaking (as opposed to 
singing), choice of clothing, etc. Therefore, from the standpoint of the contestants, it is 
not unreasonable to simply treat the viewers’ preferences over non-singing activities, as 
noise. My argument is that viewers’ noisy preference for non-singing attributes could 
paradoxically lead to an increase in aggregate singing efforts.   12
I have assumed that increasing aggregate efforts is a desirable goal of a contest 
designer. This is a reasonable goal and has been used by several authors (e.g., Konrad 
and Gradstein, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001, 2006; and Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 
2007; Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). But the contest-designer may also care about the 
distribution of efforts as well. That is, viewers may care about competitive balance 
(Szymanski, 2003). Viewers may prefer a more balanced contest to a lopsided contest 
even if aggregate effort in the former is lower. If we use the difference in efforts,  
*
1 x –*
2 x  = ln(b) as the measure of competitive balance then there is no change in 
competitive balance as the voting weight of the viewers is increased. 
Ideally, the contest designers prefer a contestant who is popular on the show and 
also has a high singing ability. But it appears that if they had to choose between the two, 
they would rather go for someone with a high singing ability and moderate popularity 
rather than someone with mediocre singing ability but with high popularity. This is 
because marketing and promotion agencies in the music industry can boost the popularity 
of a high-ability singer (after s/he has won the competition) through the choice of 
clothing, facial make up, appearances on talk shows, etc. It is much harder to improve the 




In this short article, I have argued that while some may perceive the very 
successful Fox TV reality show, American Idol, as turning into a popularity contest 
instead of the singing contest it is supposed to be, this need not be a problem. On the   13
contrary, this could boost incentives by boosting aggregate efforts in singing. If viewers 
voted based solely on singing performance, low-ability contestants may not strive hard 
enough because their chances of winning the competition will be very small. This will, in 
turn, cause high-ability contestants to exert a lower effort than they otherwise would. By 
not making success in the contest too sensitive to effort, low-ability contestants are 
paradoxically induced to exert a higher singing effort. This, in turn, forces the high-
ability contestants to work harder and not be complacent. Hence, the current voting rule 
in American Idol under which only the votes of viewers count when the number of 
contestants is narrowed to twenty-four may be good for incentives. For the same reasons, 
giving some weight to the votes of viewers in Dancing with the Stars could also be good 
for incentives. 
There may yet be another reason why the current voting rule in American Idol 
may not have perverse effects. Since the votes of viewers only count after the set of 
contestants has been narrowed to twenty-four by the judges, it is likely that there will not 
be substantial differences in the abilities of the contestants. However, the judges 
sometimes get it wrong as the Sanjaya case showed. And to be sure, the judges are not 
totally certain of a contestant’s ability. Indeed, that is what the show is about: to discover 
talent. But doing so depends on giving the right incentives to elicit sufficient singing 
efforts from the contestants. Even a high-ability contestant may rest on her laurels or be 
complacent without the right incentives. Introducing sufficient noise into the contest by 
giving the viewers sufficient voting power may well be a desirable incentive mechanism. 
As noted in section 1, making the votes of viewers count may also be a necessary 
evil intended to make viewers feel a sense of participation and boost TV ratings of the   14
show. This article has shown that this participation motive may also have other desirable 
incentive effects.  
There is, of course, now a literature in economics that recognizes that diluting 
incentives or giving low-powered incentives may actually be efficient (see the survey in 
Francois and Vlassopoulos (2007) and the references therein). This piece may also be 
seen as a contribution to that literature. 
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